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Abstract
The need for the South African (SA) National Research and Education Network (NREN) to
establish a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) was identified. CSIRTs offer a
subset of all possible security services based on the environment and needs of the customers.
Selecting this subset has its challenges as the view of the customer may differ from the provider
and knowing which services will have the most impact (or be most beneficial) is difficult. In
order to address the problem, this paper aims to propose an informed selection and prioritization
of initial services for the SA NREN CSIRT, an academic sector CSIRT in South Africa. In order
to do this, the first two stages of the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) service portfolio
management process are used: defining the services based on authoritative CSIRT literature and
analyzing them for value proposition and prioritization. A survey was used to obtain the
viewpoint of the prospective customer base. The services are then selected based on the
revelation of the SA NREN CSIRT as a coordinating CSIRT as well as the survey results. The
primary contribution is providing a list of services for the CSIRT in the context of the SA NREN
environment that can be used to develop a services portfolio. This study is useful to anyone
wishing to select services for a new CSIRT or wanting to revise a CSIRT services portfolio.

Keywords
CSIRT, CERT, security operations center, information security, incident response, services, ITIL
service portfolio management.

1. Introduction
The concept of a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) is well known in the
information security domain as: “an organization or team that provides services and support to a
defined constituency for preventing, handling, and responding to computer security incidents”
(Alberts, Dorofee, Killcrece, Ruefle & Zajicek, 2004, p. 2). These incidents include all kinds of
malicious activity on a network and PC level, ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and
hacking attempts to malware and compromised systems. A CSIRT attempts to isolate, mitigate
the effects of, disable and assist with recovery from these incidents (Killcrece, Kossakowski,
Ruefle & Zajicek, 2003a). Secondary responsibilities may include incident prevention, advisory
dissemination and security consultancy services in order to minimize risk and reduce actual
incidents. The exact services provided depend on the needs of the constituency (customer base)

and the available resources (finances and staff) (ENISA, 2006). It is useful to observe that
similar services can be provided by Security Operations Centers (SOCs) (Zimmerman, 2014).
CSIRTs have recently received renewed interest for novel areas of application like cloud
computing (with its unique information security challenges) (Ab Rahman & Choo, 2015) and in
developing countries (Ellefsen & von Solms, 2012; Wara & Singh, 2015) catching up with the
Internet bandwagon.
A National Research and Education Network (NREN) provides backbone network infrastructure,
access connectivity and specialized services to the academic and research institutions of a
country. This includes high-bandwidth links for science and research, commodity Internet
connectivity, network support and maintenance, and related services. An NREN can be seen as a
specialized Internet Service Provider (ISP) for the research and education community of a
country or region (GÉANT Association, 2010, para. 8). The South African National Research
Network (SANReN) competency area together with the Tertiary Education and Research
Network of South Africa (TENET) constitute the South African (SA) NREN. The SANReN
project team design and build the network while the TENET team operate it. Both parties are
involved in the development and provisioning of value-added services on top of the network
(Petruccione et al., 2013). As of 28 February 2015, 204 higher education and research sites were
connected to SANReN providing multi-gigabit Internet access with individual site bandwidth
averaging at 2.82 Gbps (Staphorst, 2015). The number of connected sites continues to grow,
covering nearly one million users at public universities, science councils and national research
facilities throughout South Africa.
From an ITIL perspective, SANReN and TENET are regarded as external service providers to
the beneficiaries and customers of the NREN (Cannon, 2011, p. 83). As part of its mandate to
develop new services for NREN beneficiaries, the SANReN competency area has been
investigating the establishment of a CSIRT for the SA NREN. The remainder of this paper
reports on how the SANReN team has proceeded to define the specific CSIRT services that
should be offered, commencing with a delineation of the research. Thereafter the survey
approach and results are presented followed by the selection of services in Section 7.

2. Delineating the Research
Successfully providing CSIRT services requires an holistic approach. This section focuses on
how the services themselves can be selected by presenting the research problem, objectives and
approach used in this paper.

2.1 Research Problem and Objective
The size of the SANReN makes it particularly vulnerable to malicious activity; including attacks
on the data and infrastructure. In addition, intellectual property at connected universities and
science councils is a valuable target for malicious actors. The threat of malicious activity
including data theft, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and virus outbreaks is very real and
handling incidents on this scale will require a collaborative effort.
As a means of addressing this problem, it is proposed that an academic sector CSIRT (Killcrece
et al., 2003a) be established to protect the NREN infrastructure and provide information security-

related services to the NREN customers and beneficiaries. One of the considerations is which
CSIRT services to provide. The objective of this paper is therefore to expound on the literature
study and survey process followed in order to determine which SA NREN CSIRT services
should be provided.
The approach used to achieve this objective is influenced by the manner in which people from
industry select services. Considering that a CSIRT can be seen as a team providing specialized
IT services to defined customers (the constituency) (West-Brown et al., 2003), the IT
Infrastructure Library (ITIL®), as a framework for IT service management, is certainly
applicable. Thus, an ITIL-based approach was selected to provide structure to the study.

2.2 ITIL Service Portfolio Management Approach
According to ITIL, it is critical for a service provider to ensure that they deliver value to the
consumer of the service (Cannon, 2011, p. 38). Furthermore, the value of a service lies in the
perception of the customer and not the provider (Cannon, 2011, p. 55). Although a CSIRT as a
whole can be seen as a service provided to a constituency, there are also a range of sub-services
that can be provided. These services are external, customer-facing services (Cannon, 2011, p.
52). In order to facilitate the decision of which sub-services should be provided by the SA NREN
CSIRT, a survey was constructed and distributed to the future CSIRT constituency. The
questions have an emphasis on determining the current situation and service requirements of the
CSIRT’s potential customers thus enabling one to gauge the respondent’s requirements (Cannon,
2011, p. 88) and perception of the value of each service (Cannon, 2011, pp. 56–57).
The ITIL service portfolio management process is used to define the CSIRT activities in terms of
services. There are four phases in this process: define, analyze, approve and charter (Cannon,
2011, p. 180). In this paper the first two phases are executed in part. Firstly, generic CSIRT
services are defined according to authoritative CSIRT literature in Section 4. Secondly, the value
proposition and prioritization of services for the SA NREN CSIRT is achieved in Section 7
following the survey outcomes. The methodology used to execute this process is described in the
next section.

3. Methodology
Previous studies identified core CSIRT literature from ScienceDirect, Scopus, SpringerLink,
IEEEXplore and Google Scholar based on a pattern of authoritative sources from respected
authors (Mooi & Botha, in press). The primary sources were then selected as the most relevant
publications from the associated institutions. A subset of this literature provides information on
CSIRT services, as revealed in Table 1, following the form of a concept matrix (Webster &
Watson, 2002).
Source
Smith (1994)
Brownlee
&
(1998)

Guttman

Service
information
X
XX

Institution

Description

AusCERTi
AUCK,
SUNii

This article briefly mentions CSIRT services.
An early list and description of services is provided in
this best practice RFC – including real-time (reactive)
and non-real-time (proactive) services – incident
response (triage, coordination and resolution) and
proactive activities (provisioning of information,
security tools, education and training, product

West-Brown et al. (2003)

XXX

CMUSEIiii

Killcrece et al. (2003a)

XXX

CMU-SEI

Killcrece et al. (2003b)

X

CMU-SEI

Alberts et al. (2004)

X

CMU-SEI

ENISA (2006)

XX

ENISAiv

ENISA (2010)

X

ENISA

Cichonski, Millar, Grance,
& Scarfone
(2012)

XX

NISTvi

evaluation, site security auditing and consulting).
This handbook provides an updated list of all CSIRT
services and categories as well as detailed descriptions
of each service. (The original list was presented in the
first edition of the handbook.)
Focusing on CSIRT organizational models, this report
contains the same list and descriptions as West-Brown
et al. (2003). A mapping of services to organizational
models plus a summary of all models with core and
extended services is also provided.
A state of the practice CSIRT survey. This report lists
the services with brief descriptions of the each service
category. It further reports on the services provided by
survey participant institution.
This report on CSIRT processes provides an essential
list of CSIRT services as well as the description of a
coordinating CSIRT.
This guide (in its Appendix 2) repeats the list and
descriptions from West-Brown et al. (2003).
A minimal listing of services from CERT-CCv plus a
list of extended services including forensics and
vulnerability handling is made available in this guide.
It refers to ENISA (2006) for services detail.
This report of recommendations lists the incident
response process and examples of other services (with
a short description) such as intrusion detection,
advisory distribution, education and awareness, and
information sharing.

i

Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
University of Auckland (AUCK) with Sun Microsystems (SUN)
iii Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon University
iv European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
v
The CERT coordination center
vi National Institute of Standards and Technology
ii

Table 1: Literature concept matrix for CSIRT services
From the concept matrix, the two primary sources for CSIRT services were identified based on
the quantity of services-related material: the Handbook for Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs) (West-Brown et al., 2003) and Organizational models for Computer Security
Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) (Killcrece et al., 2003a) both from the Carnegie Mellon
Software Engineering Institute (CMU-SEI). The Handbook for Computer Security Incident
Response Teams provides guidance on building and running a CSIRT with a particular focus on
the incident handling service (West-Brown et al., 2003, p. xv). In addition, a basic CSIRT
framework is provided covering the mission, constituency, organizational placing and
relationships of the CSIRT to other teams. Detailed descriptions of CSIRT services, policies and
team operations (including staffing issues) are supplied. Organizational models for Computer
Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) (Killcrece et al., 2003a) provides guidance on
selecting the correct model for an organization’s incident response capabilities. The primary
focus is on the organizational model and operational structure of the team. Common CSIRT
models with their attributes, respective advantages and disadvantages and typical service
offerings are discussed. The other sources provide inputs as indicated in the table. A study of

these sources revealed a common list of services and descriptions that developed over time. This
“standard” list and descriptions, also available on the web 1, are utilized in this paper with the
objective of establishing a baseline of CSIRT services.
Surveys are an excellent method for obtaining facts and opinions (Hofstee, 2006, p. 122).
Therefore a survey was selected as the research method towards achieving the objective of
determining which services the SA NREN CSIRT should provide. In 2012 an exploratory survey
was distributed to SANReN beneficiary institutions. This survey revealed a definite interest in
CSIRT services but also some deficiencies in understanding within the community. It was
therefore decided to perform a more in-depth literature study, host a workshop where the service
details could be explained to and discussed with the constituency and then ask the attendees to
complete a redesigned survey. This second survey was developed based on the information
obtained through the literature study, compiled in Word and physically distributed and
completed at a workshop as explained next.
In May 2015, SANReN and TENET hosted a workshop with NREN beneficiary institutions to
explore the establishment of an SA NREN CSIRT2. One of the workshop objectives was to
explain the possible services that could be provided and to determine which services should have
priority from the perspective of the participants. Attendees were educated on the possible
services through presentations and discussions. A questionnaire was then handed out to the
attendees for completion with the request that each institution respond only once. The completed
surveys (feedback) were physically collected and the results were captured in Excel for analysis
and graphing. The next section provides background on CSIRT services prior to describing the
SA NREN environment (Section 5) and presenting the results of the survey (Section 6).
Thereafter, the selection of services for the SA NREN CSIRT based on the survey results and
literature is described in Section 7.

4. CSIRT Services
According to ITIL, “A service is a means of delivering value to customers by facilitating
outcomes customers want to achieve without the ownership of specific costs and risks” (Cannon,
2011, p. 47). CSIRT services assist customers in conducting their business by facilitating a more
secure IT environment. They are classified in three broad categories, namely reactive, proactive
or security quality management services (Killcrece et al., 2003a).
As the primary CSIRT activity, reactive services involve actions taken to resolve or mitigate
incidents as they occur (Alberts et al., 2004). They are triggered by events or requests requiring a
“reaction” and thereby initiating the service process (Killcrece et al., 2003a, p. 13). Proactive
services are aimed at preventing incidents from occurring in the first place by providing related
announcements and information for preparing, protecting and securing systems (Killcrece et al.,
2003a, p. 14), training and education, monitoring and sharing information (Alberts et al., 2004).
Security quality management services have a broader focus and may be provided by the CSIRT

1
2

http://www.cert.org/incident-management/services.cfm
http://www.csir.co.za/news/2015/08/education_community.html

or another entity in an organization depending on the specific structure (Killcrece et al., 2003a, p.
14). A commonly accepted list of CSIRT services is provided in Table 2.

Reactive services

Proactive services

Security quality
management services

Service
Alerts and warnings
Incident handling – analysis, support, coordination
Incident response on site
Vulnerability handling
Artifact handling
Announcements
Technology watch
Security audits or assessments
Configuration and maintenance of security tools,
applications and infrastructure
Development of security tools
Intrusion detection services
Security-related information dissemination
Risk analysis
Business continuity and disaster recovery planning
Security consulting
Awareness building
Education and training
Product evaluation or certification

Table 2: CSIRT Services
Source: West-Brown et al. (2003)

Detailed descriptions of these services are beyond the scope of this paper but can be found in
West-Brown et al. (2003) and Killcrece et al. (2003a). Most CSIRTs do not provide all of these
services but rather a subset based on the type of CSIRT and the needs of the constituency
(Killcrece et al., 2003a, p. 14). A CSIRT should therefore select a core service offering and grow
that as the need arises and resources allow (Killcrece et al., 2003a, p. 24).

5. SA NREN Environment
In order to optimize the survey for the SA NREN CSIRT and determine the services
requirements, we needed to understand the SA NREN environment. Following the guidance
presented in Mooi & Botha (2015), the SA NREN CSIRT environment is defined as an academic
sector CSIRT serving the whole country of the Republic of South Africa. An embedded
organizational model – with SANReN, TENET or a combination of both as the hosting
organization – is preferred. These decisions are reflected in Table 3.
Type of CSIRT
Geographic area
Organizational model

Academic (research and education)
National – Republic of South Africa
Embedded – SANReN / TENET / Both

Table 3: SA NREN CSIRT Environment

This environment further reveals the constituency as the research and education institutions of
South Africa: universities, science councils and supporting organizations; an external
constituency. Based on these deductions, the SA NREN CSIRT is classified as a coordinating
CSIRT: the customers are from external organizations and the CSIRT focus would be on
coordination (Killcrece et al., 2003a, p. 130).
In order to determine the required CSIRT services is it useful to determine the current state of
affairs with respect to incident response in that environment. As described in Section 3, a survey
was selected as the instrument to perform a needs analysis and identify beneficial CSIRT
services from the perspective of the SA NREN community. The survey questions were
constructed based on the core services for coordinating CSIRTs (Killcrece et al. 2003a, pp. 136–
137). The incident, vulnerability and artifact coordination services were generalized to
“handling” and an intrusion detection service option was included as this could be attractive to
this specific constituency based on the nature of the environment 3. The next section presents the
results of the survey.

6. Survey Results and Discussion
The survey was distributed to the 25 institutions represented at the 2015 workshop to explore the
establishment of a SA NREN CSIRT. Eighteen institutions (72%) completed the survey.
Respondents were asked to rank the CSIRT services by value/importance: a score of 1 meaning
most important and 11 meaning least important. The combined responses from the 18
institutions resulted in the prioritization of services as per Table 4. As seen in the table, the top
three services are: intrusion detection services, alerts and warnings, and incident
handling/response. In the following section these results and their implications on services
selection are discussed.
The services ranking from the survey results provide useful inputs towards the SA NREN CSIRT
services selection. To finalize the selection, some other factors need to be considered. This is
because the customer’s perception may differ from that of the provider and these perceptions
need to be harmonized. For example, to illustrate with the overlap of services, providing alerts
and warnings require information to communicate on either from a technology watch service or
incident report (from the handling or intrusion detection services). The literature is also re-visited
to identify the primary sources for this type of CSIRT – identified as a coordinating CSIRT based
on the environment (see Section 5). The next section therefore describes the selection of core
services based on these factors culminating in a final selection of services for the SA NREN
CSIRT.

3

It would be more cost effective to provide a central IDS service than for each institution to
deploy their own solution. The SA NREN CSIRT will also have insight and tools not accessible
to the community that can be utilized for intrusion detection.

Rank

Service

Combined
score*
1 Intrusion detection services
52
2 Alerts and warnings
53
3 Incident handling/response
66
4 Vulnerability handling
72
5 Incident coordination
82
6 Announcements
83
7 Technology watch
86
8 Awareness building
89
9 Information dissemination
107
10 Education and training
109
11 Artifact handling
119
*combined by addition; lowest score = highest importance

Table 4: Survey Results: Services by importance

7. Selection of SA NREN CSIRT Services
Killcrece et al. (2003a, pp. 135–137) provide a summary of services offered for each type of
CSIRT identified in the handbook. This information is used to supplement the survey findings
and facilitate the selection of services for the SA NREN CSIRT as shown in Table 5. The
combined decision column shows the final decision as a combination of the survey rank together
with the services identified for coordinating CSIRTs. The selected services for the SA NREN are
shown in bold.
To be called a CSIRT, the team must provide at least one of the incident handling services:
incident analysis, response on site, support and/or coordination (West-Brown et al., 2003). For
the SA NREN CSIRT, it makes sense that at least incident response support and coordination
services are provided. Incident analysis could be offered in a limited fashion though is generally
restricted to an advisory role for coordinating CSIRTs (Killcrece et al., 2003a).
Vulnerability and artifact response coordination would form part of the incident coordination
service (as they are interdependent). Artifact handling is unlikely though as this is a coordinating
CSIRT.

Reactive
services

Proactive
services

Service

Survey rank*

Alerts and warnings
Incident handling
Incident response on
site
Vulnerability
handling
Artifact handling

2
3 + 5 (coord.)
N/A
[61% interest]
4

Announcements
Technology watch
Security audits or
assessments

6
7
N/A
[94% interest]

11

Coordinating
CSIRTs**
Yes – core
Yes – core
No –
unusual
Coordination
only
Coordination
only
Yes – core
Yes – core
No –
unusual

Combined decision
YES – high ranking + core
YES – high ranking + core
NO
YES – high ranking; coordination only
NO – low ranking
YES – med. ranking + core
YES – med. ranking + core
NO – despite high interest it is unusual
for coordinating CSIRTs

Security
quality
management
services

Security tools,
applications and
infrastructure
Development of
security tools
Intrusion detection

N/A
[83% interest]

No –
unusual

NO – unusual for coordinating CSIRTs

N/A

NO –resource intensive + additional

Information
dissemination
Risk analysis

9

No –
additional
No –
unusual
Yes – core

N/A
[83% interest]
N/A
[61% interest]
N/A
[72% interest]
8
10

No –
additional
No –
additional
No –
additional
Yes – core
Yes – core

Business continuity
and DR planning
Security consulting

1

YES – although unusual it’s the highest
ranked for this constituency
YES – although low ranked it is
integrated into the other services + core
NO – additional for coordinating
CSIRTs; consider later
NO – additional for coordinating
CSIRTs; consider later
NO – additional for coordinating
CSIRTs; consider later
YES – med. ranking + core
YES – can build on above + core

Awareness building
Education and
training
Product evaluation or N/A
No –
NO – low interest + additional
certification
[55% interest] additional
* lowest number = most important / highest rated. Interest was identified in a separate question.
** adapted from Killcrece et al. (2003a, pp. 136–137)

Table 5: CSIRT Services showing survey results and services for coordinating CSIRTs

Alerts and warnings include notifications of incidents, critical vulnerabilities or related matters
(e.g. fixes or mitigation advice) (Killcrece et al., 2003a). “The alert, warning or advisory is sent
as a reaction to the current incident state – to notify constituents of the activity and to provide
guidance for protecting or recovering affected systems.” (Cosmin Ciobanu et al., 2013, p. 4). For
the SA NREN, examples from 2013-2015 include DDoS attacks, Heartbleed, Shellshock and the
NTP vulnerability alerts.
Announcements are similar to alerts but less urgent and aimed at proactive measures to reduce
possible future incidents with medium- to long-term impact. They include general IT security
news, best practices, patch release information, hot topics, latest tools, etc. This information
equips the constituency to protect systems and networks against new vulnerabilities before they
can be exploited (West-Brown et al., 2003).
The intrusion detection service includes the deployment, monitoring and response to events
reported by sensors on the network. For the SA NREN CSIRT this could include intrusion
detection systems, honeypots, network telescopes and other sensors distributed on SANReN.
Alerts and/or incident reports could be triggered by this service. To be effective, this service
requires specialized tools or expertise (Killcrece et al., 2003a).
Awareness building, including best practices and precautions (West-Brown et al., 2003), can take
place in various forms. Direct training can form part of the incident response process for an
individual or group from the constituency. It could also be extended to workshops, tutorials,
courses, etc. Topics for awareness building include guidelines for reporting incidents, approaches
and processes for responding to incidents as well as useful tools and technologies. The exact

mechanisms and depth of service will be determined during implementation and could also
evolve with time. This is seen as a fundamental service for the SA NREN CSIRT that could be
supplemented by education and more in-depth training at a later date.
The technology watch service ``involves reading security mailing lists, security web sites, and
current news and journal articles in the fields of science, technology, politics, and government to
extract information relevant to the security of the constituent systems and networks'' (WestBrown et al., 2003, p. 30). Topics can include technical developments and emerging
technologies, security-related trends, hacker activities and even legal, social or political issues
(Killcrece et al., 2003a). This description reveals the dependence of other services on this
service.
Lastly, security-related information dissemination entails the development and publishing of
security-related information (Killcrece et al., 2003a). “This service provides constituents with a
comprehensive and easy-to-find collection of useful information that aids in improving security”
(West-Brown et al., 2003, p. 32). This information can include outputs from the technology
watch, incident handling and intrusion detection services in the form of alerts and warnings,
announcements, a knowledge base (e.g. website/wiki), dashboards or even training materials
(consult Killcrece et al. (2003a, p. 22) for additional examples).
The SA NREN service offering, as discussed in this section, is repeated in Table 6 in summary
form for clarity.

Reactive services

Proactive services
Security quality
management services

Alerts and warnings
Incident handling
Vulnerability coordination only
Announcements
Technology watch
Intrusion detection services
Information dissemination
Awareness building
Education and training

Table 6: Service offering for the SA NREN CSIRT
This offering is a subset of the services for coordinating CSIRTs with the addition of intrusion
detection services based on the environment and survey results as described previously in this
section.
This information facilitates the compilation of a services portfolio for the SA NREN CSIRT.
During the establishment phase, the other areas of CSIRT requirements (staffing, tools, policies,
etc.) can be developed accordingly (Mooi & Botha, in press). Once the CSIRT is operational,
these services would be offered as described. As the CSIRT matures and the needs of the
constituency develop, additional services can be provided for inclusion in the services pipeline
thereby extending the services offering (for ideas consult Killcrece et al. (2003a, pp. 26–30)).

8. Conclusion
Following the identification of the need for an academic sector, coordinating CSIRT in South
Africa, this paper described the process of selecting the initial services for the SA NREN CSIRT.
Firstly, CSIRTs and the South African NREN environment were introduced. Thereafter the
research problem (reducing the threat of malicious activity and coordinating incident response on
the NREN) and objective (determining which CSIRT services should be provided) was
described. The ITIL service portfolio management approach used to achieve this objective was
presented next. This approach entails defining the services informed by authoritative CSIRT
literature, the specific environment, as well as the perspective of the future constituency.
Section 3 described how the literature study and survey method were used to collect the data for
the paper. The next section introduced CSIRT services with a detailed description of the service
categories and a list of all possible services. The SA NREN environment, as an important factor
to consider when selecting services, was described next. In order to determine the constituency’s
perspective on which services should be provided, a survey was utilized and filled in by
attendees of an SA NREN CSIRT workshop.
In Section 6 the survey results were presented followed by a brief discussion on how these
results could be used to inform the selection of services complemented by literature advice and
considering the environment. Lastly, the actual selection of the SA NREN CSIRT initial service
offering is presented in Section 7. This result is a useful foundation for the development of the
CSIRT services portfolio. The paper serves as an illustration of how CSIRT services can be
selected and prioritized and is useful for anyone desiring to perform a similar exercise or
maintain a CSIRT services portfolio.
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